Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 12

Number 3

Article 1

7-1-2005

Urban Welfare and Work Experiences: Implications for Welfare
Reform
Christopher T. King
University of Texas at Austin

Peter R. Mueser
University of Missouri

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research
Part of the Social Welfare Commons

Citation
King, Christopher T., and Peter R. Mueser. 2005. "Urban Welfare and Work Experiences: Implications for
Welfare Reform." Employment Research 12(3): [1]–4. https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.12(3)-1

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

W.E.

UPJOHN INSTITUTE
FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH

INSTITUTE REPOSITORY

Urban Welfare and Work Experiences:
Implications for Welfare Reform
Christopher T. King and Peter R. Mueser

Employment Research / Upjohn Institute,
Vol. 12(3) (July 2005), pp. 1–4

Copyright ©2005. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved.

JULY 2005

Christopher T. King and Peter R. Mueser
Christopher T. King
and Peter R. Mueser

Urban Welfare and Work
Experiences: Implications
for Welfare Reform
u
David W. Emmons, Eva Madly, and
Stephen A. Woodbury

Refundable Tax Credits
for Health Insurance
u

2005 Grant Awards
u

New Books
Vol. 12, No. 3
Employment Research is published
quarterly by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research. Issues appear in
January, April, July, and October.
The Institute is a nonproﬁt research
organization devoted to ﬁnding and
promoting solutions to employment-related
problems at the national, state, and local
level. The Institute is an activity of the W.E.
Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation,
which was established in 1932 to administer
a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn,
founder of the Upjohn Company, to conduct
research on the causes and effects of
unemployment and seek measures for the
alleviation of the hardships suffered by the
unemployed.
W.E. Upjohn Institute
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
(269) 343-5541
www.upjohninstitute.org
Randall W. Eberts
Executive Director

ISSN 1075–8445

Urban Welfare
and Work Experiences
Implications for Welfare Reform
NOTE: This article highlights some of the research
ﬁndings that appear in the authors’ new book,
Welfare and Work: Experiences in Six Cities, which
is available from the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7).

T

he last decade has seen
extraordinary changes in U.S. welfare
programs. Even as early as 1970, with
greater numbers of mothers in paid
employment, public opinion had begun
to shift toward an increased emphasis on
work as an alternative to welfare. The
shift to an employment-focused system
gained momentum in the 1990s, initially
with states modifying Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC)
under federal waivers, and culminating
in passage of the federal Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act in 1996. This
bipartisan legislation, which replaced
AFDC with Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), established
explicit program participation and work
requirements for participants, limited the
length of time recipients could receive
aid, and further expanded state autonomy.
Reform-oriented policy changes
during the 1990s were accompanied by
major declines in the national caseload.
After peaking at 5.0 million in 1994,
caseloads began a decline, falling to
3.9 million in 1997, the year TANF was
implemented in most states, and 2.6
million in 1999, a level not seen since
1970. While increasing numbers of

families are transitioning from welfare
to work, whether welfare leavers will
succeed in achieving stable employment
and economic self-sufﬁciency over the
long term remains in question. Many
recipients face signiﬁcant barriers to
employment, and those who get jobs
commonly cycle in and out of work, earn
low wages, and often continue to rely on
government supports.
In this article we present ﬁndings
from Welfare and Work: Experiences
in Six Cities, in which we examined
welfare participation and labor market
involvement of female welfare recipients
during the 1990s. Our analysis relied
on individual-level welfare data linked
to state earnings records for the core
counties in six major urban areas—
Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Fort
Lauderdale, Houston, and Kansas City—
which together accounted for around 5
percent of the nation’s welfare caseload
in 1991.1 The selected sites provide
considerable diversity, as they include
cities from a very low-beneﬁt state
(Texas) and a classic northern urban area
(Chicago), two cities on the border of the
old South (Baltimore and Kansas City),
and a traditional southern city (Atlanta).
Three of the cities have signiﬁcant
representation of Hispanics.
The cities chosen also allowed us to
examine the extent to which differences
in state and local policy, administrative
directives, and local labor market
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conditions contribute to observed
trends. Policy and administrative
changes designed to move families
from the rolls have been facilitated by a
growing economy, much more so than
in the late 1980s and early 1990s during
implementation of earlier reforms. Other
supportive policy changes—including
expansions of the federal Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, and child
care subsidies—were also occurring
during this period.
Caseload declines vary among our
sites but are substantial. They bracket
the national decline, ranging from 44
percent in Kansas City to 81 percent
in Fort Lauderdale. Many of the legal
and policy changes following from

Overall, we conclude that the
kinds of jobs welfare recipients
obtain have not seriously
deteriorated over the 1990s.
welfare reform focused on the activities
of recipients, attempting to create both
incentives and opportunities for them
to obtain employment and exit welfare.
Time limits pushed people from the rolls,
and mandatory programs attempted to
help recipients build job skills and obtain
employment. Some elements of welfare
reform were also designed to reduce entry
onto welfare. Explicit diversion programs
were adopted by many states, in some
cases requiring potential recipients to
engage in job search before applying
for welfare. Our analyses show that at
each of our sites, increases in the welfare

exit rate alone would have produced
important caseload declines, ranging
from 30 to 64 percent. Yet declines in
the numbers entering welfare contributed
substantially as well, causing caseloads to
fall by 20 to 71 percent.

suggests that reforms were somewhat
successful in achieving the act’s
employment goals. A fuller understanding
requires looking at the types of jobs
welfare leavers obtained and the factors
determining their employment success.

Employment of Welfare Leavers

Looking at Recipients’ Jobs

Employment of leavers is of
particular concern because national
and state welfare reforms placed
increased emphasis on this route of
exit from welfare. Those supporting
welfare reforms argued that training
and related provisions, in conjunction
with work requirements, would move
welfare families into the world of work,
providing them with new opportunities
for betterment. Critics warned that it was
more likely that reforms would force
those who were ill-prepared for work to
seek aid from family, private charities,
or less restrictive public programs,
causing increased hardship and ultimately
damaging the welfare of their children.
Table 1 provides employment rates
for those exiting welfare in each of
our sites. We see that rates increased
substantially between 1994 and 1997
but changed little between 1997 and
1999. These results do not accord with
the views of either the supporters or the
critics of reform. Moderate increases in
the employment rates for welfare leavers
in the face of the extraordinary economic
growth in the 1990s do not suggest
unprecedented opportunity for those who
left welfare. On the other hand, the fact
that employment rates did not decline

A central goal of welfare reform
is moving recipients into stable jobs.
Welfare recipients tend to have unstable,
short-term jobs, with few beneﬁts and
low wages. Although we are unable to
determine beneﬁts, wage records allow
us to determine how long an employee
receives earnings from a given employer.
Table 2 provides information on the
stability of jobs obtained by welfare
recipients. Only about half of all jobs
last beyond the quarter in which they
start, and this proportion did not change
appreciably between 1994–1995 and
1998–1999.
Only 4–10 percent of jobs last eight
quarters or more. In three of the ﬁve sites
where we can make comparisons, we
see that the number of such long-term
jobs has declined. Although these results
might suggest a decline in the quality of
jobs welfare recipients obtain, we found
that similar declines occurred for other
workers in the same ﬁrms. And, even
where job stability has declined, earnings
have not. Overall, we conclude that the
kinds of jobs welfare recipients obtain
have not seriously deteriorated over the
1990s.
While changes over time are modest at
best, by any standard welfare recipients’
jobs are poor ones. Over the life of the
job—up to two years for our data—
average cumulative earnings are only
between $2,000 (for Atlanta) and $5,000
(for Chicago).2 Few of these jobs lead to
economic self-sufﬁciency for mothers
with one or more dependents. Some
individuals may obtain sufﬁcient earnings
to move off of welfare and support their
families if they succeed in cobbling
together multiple low-paying jobs into
a semi-steady earnings stream. Others
may stumble onto a good job only after
many tries.

Table 1 Employment Rate for Welfare Leavers in Six Areas
Area
Atlanta
Baltimore
Chicago
Fort Lauderdale
Houston
Kansas City

1994
58.5
44.8
48.6a
53.3
43.7
57.6

Employment rate (%)
1997
64.5
54.6
54.5
53.2
50.4
65.2

1999
61.2
59.7
56.7
55.4
49.1
66.0

NOTE: All measures apply to federal ﬁscal year (October–September) unless indicated otherwise.
Site measures are means for four quarters.
a
Fiscal year 1996.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations
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Table 2 Stability of Jobs Held by Welfare Recipients in Six Areas

Atlanta
Baltimore
Chicago
Fort Lauderdale
Houston
Kansas City

Probability that job lasts
more than 7 quarters

1994–95

1998–99

1994–95

1998–99

0.472
0.536
0.539
0.517
0.533
0.441

0.457
0.525
0.561
0.519
0.527
0.428

0.050
0.089
0.100
0.075
0.073
0.044

0.050
0.060
0.097
0.068
n/a
0.032

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Finding a Good Job
Although opportunities clearly are
limited, recipients who obtain the best
jobs have substantial advantages. In
all of our areas, the standard deviation
of total earnings on a job is at least 50
percent greater than the mean, implying
that some jobs provide reasonably
good long-term earnings in these urban
labor markets. In considering how a
particular welfare recipient achieves
stable employment, it is natural to ask

Despite the poor prospects
offered by the average welfare
recipient’s job, we ﬁnd
evidence that some jobs do
offer greater opportunities.
how important individual characteristics
are in determining job stability and
earnings. If individual characteristics
are of primary importance, there is
little beneﬁt in placing individuals with
certain employers, since the only route
to achieving economic self-sufﬁciency
will be to augment their human capital. In
contrast, if certain employers offer highly
desirable jobs—jobs that provide high
stability and earnings to any incumbent—
individuals lucky enough to land them
will do relatively well over time.
What factors determine differences in
earnings and job stability across jobs? We
ﬁnd that demographic characteristics play
a role, but their effects are quite modest.
In contrast, the industry of the employer
is of substantial importance. Furthermore,
when we examine those ﬁrms that

employ many welfare recipients, we ﬁnd
that employers differ from one another
quite dramatically. Some employers
appear to offer unstable employment
and low wages to all their employees,
whereas others offer relative stability and
higher wages.
One may be concerned, however,
that observed differences between
employers are the result of unmeasured
differences between individuals. If some
employers hire particularly capable
individuals, but the differences between
individuals are not readily observable,
we may mistakenly assume that they
offer desirable jobs. If this were the case,
there would be no beneﬁt in placing less
qualiﬁed workers with such employers,
since they would be expected to face
summary dismissal. Fortunately, we

Conclusions
The 1990s saw a dramatic shift
in the character and focus of welfare

Figure 1 Predicted Total Earnings for Job in Selected Industries
9
8
7
Quarterly earnings (000s $)

Variables

Probability that job lasts
more than 1 quarter

are able to examine the importance
of unmeasured individual factors,
since many welfare recipients obtain
multiple jobs. As might be expected,
our analysis conﬁrms that unmeasured
differences between individuals do play
an important role. But we ﬁnd that even
after controlling for such person “ﬁxed
effects,” substantial differences between
jobs remain.
An indication of the extent to which
jobs differ can be seen by observing
industry differences. Figure 1 reports the
total expected earnings for jobs in ﬁve
industries, controlling for unmeasured
individual characteristics. Although there
are differences across our sites, variation
in expected earnings across industries is
generally consistent. As expected, jobs in
temporary help services ﬁrms provide the
lowest expected total earnings, reﬂecting
both shorter duration of employment and
lower quarterly earnings. Retail trade
provides somewhat greater job stability
and higher earnings, as does restaurant
work. Manufacturing jobs are appreciably
better than jobs in these other industries,
often with total earnings two or three
times those for temporary help jobs.

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Eating, drinking

Atlanta

Manufacturing

Baltimore

Retail trade, other

Chicago

Temporary help

Fort Lauderdale

Houston

Other service

Kansas City

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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in the United States. The proportion
of recipients working increased
substantially, and employment also was
more prevalent among those leaving
welfare. However, the kinds of jobs
obtained by welfare recipients did not
change dramatically. Expected earnings
and job stability remained low for most
recipients of cash assistance, and few of
the jobs recipients landed could assure
economic self-sufﬁciency.
Despite the poor prospects offered
by the average welfare recipient’s job,
we ﬁnd evidence that some jobs do offer
greater opportunities. Even recipients
who have had a string of dead-end or
short-lived jobs may ultimately be able
to obtain a job providing a reasonable
chance for economic self-sufﬁciency.
Federal and state reforms of the
1990s have not altered this dynamic
signiﬁcantly. The goal of reduced
dependency has been attained in that
fewer individuals now receive cash aid
and more are working. But there is no
evidence that reform has substantially
improved the lives of recipients or former
recipients.
Congress continues to struggle with
reauthorizing the Personal Responsibility
Act, having passed a series of temporary
extensions since the Act expired at the
end of September 2002. Yet differences
between the House and Senate over
work and participation requirements,
allowable activities, and other issues
have been substantial enough to keep
those bodies from succeeding in crafting
new legislation. Our research supports
the view that the reforms of the 1990s
were successful in moving individuals
off the welfare rolls and into jobs. But
if the ultimate goal is economic selfsufﬁciency and not simply reductions in
“dependency,” revisions of the program
will need to go far beyond the reforms
currently envisioned.
Notes
1. Our analysis uses data from the county
containing the central city. For convenience, we
refer to each area by the city name.
2. This ﬁgure is the sum of earnings for as long
as the job lasts, up to eight quarters, with earnings
adjusted for inﬂation and reported in 1999 fourthquarter dollars.
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David W. Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury

Refundable Tax Credits
for Health Insurance
NOTE: This article summarizes David W.
Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury’s
“Refundable Tax Credits for Health Insurance:
The Sensitivity of Simulated Impacts to Assumed
Behavior,” Upjohn Institute Working Paper
05-119, 2005. See http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
publications/wp/05-119.pdf.

Dissatisfaction with the level
and growth of the share of the U.S.
population without health insurance
has spurred interest in alternatives to
the existing system of ﬁnancing health
care, which is dominated by employerprovided health insurance among the
nonpoor and nonelderly. One approach
to reform would be to adopt a refundable
tax credit for health insurance under
the federal personal income tax. Such a
policy would grant a tax credit up to a
prespeciﬁed maximum—for example,
$1,000 for an individual or $2,000 for a

Clearly, these wide simulated
ranges highlight the uncertainty
inherent in modeling the effects
of health insurance tax credits.
family—on a tax return where the ﬁler
purchased a private, nonemployer health
insurance policy. For ﬁlers whose tax
bill was less than the amount paid for
insurance, the difference between the tax
bill and the credit would be paid to the
ﬁler—hence, the refundable nature of the
tax credit.
The refundable tax credit is attractive
for at least two reasons. First, it would
make the same tax-favored treatment
of health insurance available to all
individuals, regardless of whether
they are employed and regardless of
whether their employer provides a
health insurance plan. As a result, it
should increase the number of insured
individuals and decrease uninsurance.
Second, a tax credit would generate
growth in the market for private
nonemployer health insurance and

increase the population of health care
consumers that have an interest in
the characteristics and cost of their
coverage. These informed, cost-conscious
consumers could put a brake on
increasing health care costs.
The extent to which a tax credit for
health insurance would reduce the
number of uninsured individuals has been
controversial. Pauly, Song, and Herring
(2001) and others have simulated a
variety of different tax credit policies and
have found that a “reasonably generous”
credit could reduce the number of
uninsured individuals on the order of 50
percent. However, simulations by Gruber
(2000a,b) suggest that a health insurance
tax credit might reduce the number of
uninsured by only about 10 percent.
Here, we summarize a recent study
replicating and extending Gruber’s
simulations (Emmons, Madly, and
Woodbury 2005). Our goal is to
illuminate Gruber’s modeling of health
insurance coverage under a tax credit and
to examine the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the model’s key parameters;
that is, we want to understand what
makes the simulation model tick. The
ﬁndings from this exercise are most
relevant to Gruber’s widely discussed
ﬁndings and to the particular tax credit
analyzed. The simulations should not be
interpreted as being relevant to proposals
that, for example, would cover different
populations, would apply tax credits of a
different amount, or would eliminate the
exclusion of employer contributions for
employees’ health insurance premiums
from employees’ taxable income.
Outline of the Simulation Model
The simulation model we use is
essentially a set of rules for determining
whether a given individual (or family)
would take up a federal refundable tax
credit of $1,000 (for a single individual)

